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FOREWORD 
Why Life Now? 
As we struggle to understand and prepare ourselves for climate change, 
the effects of globalized neoliberal capitalism, and violence (both govern-
mental and extra-governmental) on a planetary scale, we also struggle to 
name what it is that we cherish and hope to foster and protect as well as 
what it is that, of itself, opposes the forces that may well destroy us. One of 
the words that has emerged in this context is life. 
Philosophers do well to pay close attention to any concept that attains 
such centrality and exercises such power in our thinking, which is one 
reason to be grateful for the thinking collected in Feminist Philosophies of 
Life and for the editorial work that brought it together. The collection could 
not be more timely. Yet it is also puzzling, prodding a reader to wonder: 
What is it that brings these very different essays together? They all speak 
of life, but when they do so, do they speak of the same thing? 
Editors Sharp and Taylor are aware of the question, and the answer 
they give has to do not so much with the thematic content of the essays 
but rather with their strategic intent. Something has changed in feminist 
thinking since the turn of the twenty-first century, and that change is re-
flected here, they suggest. Whereas so much feminist scholarship in the 
last century was dedicated to exposing "the tendency of discourses to nor-
malize and exclude;' as they write in the introduction, these essays strive 
to move beyond those discourses and imagine and cultivate new ways to 
speak, think, and act. And a necessary step in that project is "to ask what 
life is." No one essay answers that question or even addresses it directly. 
But the great value of the collection as a whole lies in its creation of an 
occasion for philosophical meditation on the question and its implica-
tions and possibilities. 
I confess to skepticism regarding the ontological importance of the 
question; as a student of Foucault's work, I much prefer to treat powerful 
terms - which life most definitely is - as effects of and operators within 
historical and political forces. Nevertheless, I believe the editors are right 
to raise it as a general intellectual imperative. What is life? What is life? 
What is life doing here, among us, in our work, in this feminist philosoph-
ical moment? 
In this collection - and in fact in much of the work now referred to as 
feminist new materialisms and posthumanism - the term life operates in 
a number of ways and has multiple meanings and effects. These are not 
necessarily contradictory or mutually exclusive - in fact, some functions 
and meanings reinforce or shade into each other - but there are differ-
ences. And it is important, I think, to consider these differences in their 
differences as well as in their overlappings and similarities. Although I 
would like to consider how life functions in posthumanisms and new ma-
terial"isms in general, here I will simply identify and briefly explore a few 
of the divergences that occur in the present collection. 
Herein life names, first and obviously, the course that one traverses be-
tween birth and death. Life is not a general phenomenon but an oft re-
peated - though never precisely replicated - particular one. It is my life, 
your life, the president's life, the life of the janitor who cleans my class-
room. As Jane Barter writes (following Adriana Cavarero and opposing 
Giorgio Agamben), there is no such thing as bare life; there is always a 
"who;' and a singular who at that. It is not clear to me whether Barter would 
attribute a who to the lives of nonhuman beings, but many contributors 
to this collection might well do so; not only my life and your life, then, but 
also those of the doe and the oak tree, and the twenty-one-day life of the 
evasively buzzing house fly. Each is particular, though we may not be able 
to discern it in its material and temporal particularity. 
Related to this first way of employing the word life are the ways in which 
some of these authors use Gilbert Simondon's concept of individuating, 
Stephen D. Seely most overtly. For Simondon, as Seely explicates, life is or 
at least fundamentally involves the activity of individuation. This is not 
to say that any living being ever becomes a complete individual totally 
separated from all others, but that each emerges out of an indeterminate 
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multiplicity in an ongoing process of differing from its own field of emer-
gence. Particularity, or singularity, though not individualism, is affirmed; 
differentiation takes precedence over replication of the same. Life is this 
activity of differentiation, ever differing from "itself" - that is, from what-
ever is. 
Another way that life functions in these essays is as a means to em-
phasize the occurrence of activity without total predictability, without 
epistemic or ontological certainty. Life is change - self-transformation (or 
perhaps a middle-voiced event of materially transforming itself, with no 
determined and determining telos). It points, therefore, at what always ul-
timately escapes the forces styled and ranged to catch it, manipulate it, 
direct it, and manage it - forces such as the carceral eugenic complex that 
Lisa Guenther identifies in chapter 11. Life "is" resistant to conceptualiza-
tion and instrumental rationality. It names a material force that is, finally, 
unnamable and untamable. 
Yet another function of life in many of these essays is to oppose the 
assumption of passivity in material existence. Understanding life as 
matter's self-organizing activity rather than as some kind of nonmaterial 
force added to or acting on materiality "destabilizes anthropocentric 
and humanist ontological privilege; writes Astrida Neimanis in chap-
ter 2. Indeed, these authors assert, matter needs no external nonmaterial 
impetus or mentality; it is its own agent fo~ change. A sort of Spinozist 
monism runs through much of this collection, a nonreductive material-
ism that celebrates matter as a (self-)organizing, structuring, transforming 
force - in other words, that celebrates life not or not only as particularities 
of becoming, but as a general phenomenon of material transformation of 
planetary and perhaps cosmic proportions. 
Celebration, but also alarm, animates many of these essays. Life is what 
is most endangered; life is what must be protected; harm to life must be 
averted to whatever extent possible. Climate change, mass extinction, 
discrimination against the disabled, violence against queer people, mur-
ders ofindigenous women of Manitoba, eugenic incarceration - all these 
forces assail not just individuals and classes but also life itself. For that 
reason, as well as others, these issues are of great feminist concern. Life as 
trans-formal phenomenon is not only valorized, therefore, but also power-
fully desired and fearfully defended. Is life emerging here as another name 
for the good? At times, one might be justified in suspecting so. At other 
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times, it can have no such metaphysical meaning. And that tense differ-
ence is worth pondering at length as feminists take up this work for further 
exploration and elaboration. 
Life points in many directions in this collection, then: life as singular 
temporal becoming, life as nonteleological event, life as active material 
self-organization, life as to be desired and protected from harm. Life works 
very hard. But why? Why life, and why now? 
Many feminists now search for ways to talk about ways of being that are 
not accommodated by - and in fact are largely inexpressible in - Enlight-
enment humanistic and liberal discourses. We witness a broad rejection, 
here and elsewhere, of atomized individualism and valorized mentality; 
of the purely spiritual; of hard distinctions between subject and object, 
self and other, Homo sapiens and our coevolving cohort of eukaryotes 
and even prokaryotes. But this rejection is not new to feminist thought. 
Feminist philosophy and cultural critique have taken Enlightenment Man 
as a major target for four decades. We need only remember the work of 
Genevieve Lloyd or Susan Griffin or Carolyn Merchant. Feminists have 
virtually always understood Cartesian dualism and liberal political theory, 
with its emphasis on rational self-mastery, to exclude the feminine, the 
effeminate, and anyone or anything that might be labelled as such, includ-
ing "nature." Knowledge figured as the disinterested subject's mastery of 
the inert object is an old and well-treated theme. Critique of Enlighten-
ment Man is not new among feminists, which has prompted many critics 
to suggest that there is nothing really new at all about the supposedly new 
feminist materialisms. 
What may be new, as Sharp and Taylor suggest, is this particular con-
certed effort to leave Enlightenment Man behind, which here and else-
where now often takes the form of an attempt to produce an ontology that 
simply excludes him. The Enlightenment Man is decentred - totally mar-
ginalized if not eradicated - in favour of an all-inclusive, down-to-earth, 
inherently self-overcoming concept of life. 
This decentralization is a bold move beyond critique toward creation. It 
signals a break, albeit an incomplete one, with the feminist theory of the 
twentieth century, a decision to be done with the work of finding the fault 
lines in masculinist cultures, and to turn instead to the work of building 
new conceptual frameworks and systems for thinking. In that context, life 
is a versatile new building material - the twenty-first century's concrete or 
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synthetic polymer - whose potential for conceptual formation and struc-
turing is currently under exuberant exploration. What can life do? Where 
can thinking with life take us? 'These essays embody preliminary answers 
to those questions, even when they do not overtly state them: unlike man, 
life is inclusive of the nonrational; unlike man, life is immanent in and as 
the material world. And insofar as life differs in these ways from man, it 
enables thinking to diverge and venture. 
But there are reasons to worry about all this. As Lynne Huffer warns, 
there are dangers in using life as our means of departure from Enlighten-
ment thinking. In our time, she writes, life is a problem. She means this 
in a very specific Foucauldian sense: life is problematized; it is a site of 
interrogation, analysis, and struggle. Far from a happily neutral given, it is 
a particularly fraught and intensified node of power/knowledge. 
Huffer offers a brief but very important genealogy of this notion of 
life, likening it to Foucault's description of sex in The History of Sexual-
ity, volume 1. Sex is a product of biopower, according to Foucault, not the 
natural given upon which power seizes. Sex is the node formed where bio-
power groups together, "in artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological 
functions, conducts, sensations, pleasures, and it enabled one to make use 
of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a 
secret to be discovered everywhere."1 Huffer suggests that in both Judith 
Butler's and Elizabeth Grosz's work, life functions very much as sex func-
tioned in biopolitical discourses of sexuality as they emerged in the late 
nineteenth century. Life is an artificial unity surreptitiously comprising 
disparate elements but posing as the common key to understanding our-
selves and our world. If that is a plausible claim, the obvious danger is that 
life tends to operate as an allegedly transhistorical signifier; it purports to 
have no history and no political investments. But it does, and because it 
does, we feminists are not in control of how it operates through our dis-
cursive productions. 
If life is to be a major force in organizing feminist thinking now, Huffer 
cautions us to be very deliberate and as clear as possible about life's histor-
ies and politics. We need a conception oflife that is alert in its own mani-
festations of those forces and their contingencies. She suggests that the 
conception that Foucault offers is less apt to lead in directions that fem-
inist materialist~ do not want to go than are less genealogically informed 
conceptions. Foucault's concept of life is unstable in that, as Huffer puts it, 
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"the evidentiary matter that grounds our belief in something called life 
is, by definition, fragmented, incomplete, and shifting:'2 His genealogical 
approach - in particular his archival research - focuses on "material traces 
oflives" {note the plural) and thus "can break open the metaphysical frame 
of life itself that characterizes some feminist renaturalization projects:'3 
Whether we use Foucault's techniques or others, we must take care to 
attend the materialities of singular lives, multiple and mortal, not life as a 
sort of universal presence. 
The space of philosophical meditation created by Feminist Philosophies 
of Life is a crucial one, therefore. The project of thinking how to think -
thinking thinking - without Enlightenment Man is among the most im-
portant facing us. We are rapidly living into an unforeseeable future that 
will demand of us a new ethos, new ethea. Will life help us imagine a path 
into it? Is that what life is doing here? 
Ladelle McWhorter 
August2015 
NOTES 
1 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 11 154. 
2 Ibid., 122. 
3 Ibid. 
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